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549 
   
UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Robert Post* 
It is a rare privilege to be read and engaged by such thoughtful and 
insightful commentators as the Washington Law Review has assembled. 
It is exhilarating to participate in a conversation of this range and 
intensity. I am very grateful to the Washington Law Review, Ronald K.L. 
Collins and David Skover, and the University of Washington School of 
Law, for making this symposium possible. 
As I read the contributions to this symposium, I am put in mind of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous injunction that “[w]e must think things 
not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the 
facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.”1 
Although lawyers love words and language, “the real justification of a 
rule of law,” Holmes argued, “is that it helps to bring about a social end 
which we desire.”2 Holmes’ advice was to pay close attention to whether 
our legal words in fact function to serve our social ends. 
Nowhere is the disjunction between words and ends more apparent 
than in First Amendment jurisprudence. We suffer from First 
Amendment hypertrophy. Doctrine proliferates endlessly and 
meaninglessly. Around every corner is yet another confusing First 
Amendment “test.” We barely ever stop to ask what social ends are 
actually served by this barrage of inconsistent and abstract doctrine. We 
rarely take time to “translate our [First Amendment] words into the facts 
for which they stand.” 
The illuminating contribution of Bruce E.H. Johnson and Sarah K. 
Duran3 seems fortunately almost immune from this affliction. Strategic 
                                                     
* Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author retains the 
copyright in this article and authorizes royalty-free reproduction for non-profit purposes, provided 
any such reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington Law Review. 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 
(1899). Holmes’ words came in an address delivered before the New York State Bar Association on 
January 17, 1899.  
2. Id.  
3. Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, A View from the First Amendment Trenches: 
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Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are theoretically 
interesting precisely because they illustrate the disjunction between legal 
words and social ends. Plaintiffs bring SLAPP suits to enforce rights 
created by substantive legal doctrine. Substantive legal doctrine, 
especially when subject to constitutional standards that determine 
whether particular speech acts should receive First Amendment 
immunity, ought accurately to reflect our values. At first blush, 
therefore, SLAPP suits ought not to be problematic; defendants should 
prevail whenever constitutional standards provide that their speech 
deserves constitutional protection. 
This way of thinking, however, does not pay sufficient attention to 
how legal standards actually function. It fails to appreciate the 
transaction costs associated with litigation enforcing substantive 
doctrine. Defending even an unmeritorious suit can be costly and time-
consuming, and this expense will likely discourage otherwise protected 
participation in public discussion. The anti-SLAPP statutes Johnson and 
Duran discuss are designed to address and nullify such transaction costs. 
They not only shift attorneys’ fees, but they also create pathways for the 
“prompt and inexpensive” resolution of SLAPP suits.4 Johnson and 
Duran invite us to theorize the actual behavioral effects of enforcing 
substantive First Amendment standards; they direct our attention to the 
reality that underlies doctrine. 
The idea that substantive First Amendment rules should take account 
of the transaction costs of litigating First Amendment rights is a deep 
insight. It ultimately derives from the legal realism inspired by Holmes. 
Johnson and Duran are concerned with how the costs of enforcing First 
Amendment doctrine affect actual participation in public discourse. The 
first decision of the U.S. Supreme Court systematically to reason in this 
way was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 which fashioned the “actual 
malice” rule precisely to nullify the transaction costs of libel litigation.6 
It designed the actual malice rule to anticipate and nullify the “chilling 
                                                     
Washington State’s New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy, 87 WASH. L. REV. 495 
(2012). 
4. Id. at 497. 
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
6. Id. at 279. Under the “actual malice” standard, a public official must prove with “convincing 
clarity” that a statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not” before recovering for defamation. Id. at 279–80, 285–86. The case 
represented a revolution in legal thinking. Robert C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the 
Warren Court, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 11, 22–23 (1991). Whether the actual malice rule was 
ultimately successful is a debatable question. See RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND 
THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 200–04 (1987). 
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effect” of ordinary and otherwise constitutionally defensible substantive 
rules of defamation liability. The anti-SLAPP statutes so helpfully 
analyzed by Johnson and Duran are legislative interventions created to 
accomplish precisely the same result.7 
Anti-SLAPP statutes anticipate and nullify the chilling effects 
produced by First Amendment litigation. Johnson and Duran discuss 
various forms of anti-SLAPP statutes that differently specify the precise 
scope of public participation that ought to be protected from the 
transaction costs of First Amendment litigation.8 It is clear that we can 
intelligibly evaluate the differences among these anti-SLAPP statutes 
only if we first specify the precise “social ends” that we wish to use First 
Amendment doctrine to attain. 
This may sound like an obvious framework for analysis, but it is all 
too frequently ignored in First Amendment scholarship. The social ends 
that underlie First Amendment doctrine are deeply obscure. Misled by 
the seeming simplicity and generality of First Amendment doctrine, we 
imagine that the goal of First Amendment doctrine is to protect speech 
itself. But in fact nothing could be further from the truth.9 
The difficulty is apparent in the concise and lucid contribution by 
Judge Thomas Ambro and Paul Safier.10 Ambro and Safier correctly 
observe that the First Amendment does not apply in the absence of state 
action, and they rightly affirm that the First Amendment must thus be 
interpreted in light “of the dangers uniquely associated with government 
interference in the development and expression of ideas.”11 But they 
interpret these dangers in light of what they regard as “the pervasive 
First Amendment norm of content neutrality,”12 and they deduce from 
this norm that we ought to preclude government from “pick[ing] 
winners” within “‘expert’ disputes.”13 They speculate that this 
conclusion is justified by the limited institutional competence of courts. 
How, they ask, can “ill-informed judges” possibly make 
“pronouncements from seemingly ex cathedra seats of judgment”?14 
                                                     
7. See Johnson & Duran, supra note 3, at 501 (“[T]he threat of costly SLAPPs can effectively 
deter the exercise of free expression.”). 
8. Id. at 501–06. 
9. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 1–25 (2012). 
10. Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier, The First Amendment, the Courts, and “Picking 
Winners,” 87 WASH. L. REV. 397 (2012).  
11. Id. at 400. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 401, 402, 408.  
14. Id. at 404. 
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Ambro and Safier’s argument is built on the premise that “the 
pervasive First Amendment norm of content neutrality” corresponds to 
what Holmes calls “the real and the true.”15 But this premise is false. It 
turns out that the rule against content discrimination is applied in only 
limited circumstances. The rule applies to speech within public discourse 
but not to speech outside of public discourse. Government routinely 
regulates commercial speech based upon its content; we know that 
commercial speech enjoys no First Amendment protection if it is false or 
misleading.16 Government also routinely regulates the speech of 
professionals like doctors based upon its content. Bad advice risks 
sanctions for medical malpractice.17 There are countless such 
examples.18 
Judge Ambro has himself written an excellent opinion in Natale v. 
Camden County Correctional Facility19 in which he accurately observes 
that “[i]n the typical malpractice case, the duty of care, or ‘the standard 
of practice to which the defendant-practitioner failed to adhere[,] must 
be established by expert testimony.’”20 But this observation implies that 
courts must determine the competence of medical advice based upon 
their evaluation of expert testimony. When expert testimony conflicts, 
courts must pick a “winner” in order to ascertain liability. 
I mention this prosaic example to illustrate how easily we are misled 
by abstract First Amendment doctrine. The “pervasive norm” of content 
neutrality does not apply to the typical malpractice case, in which courts 
are routinely regarded as capable of “picking winners” within “expert 
disputes.” In fact, courts evaluate expert opinion virtually every time 
they determine whether to admit expert testimony challenged under Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.21 Because there is no universally 
                                                     
15. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 460. 
16. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 
(1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that 
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”). 
17. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 949–52 (2007). 
18. See Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 451–
52 (2012) (“Outside what Schauer calls the ‘boundaries’ of conventional First Amendment 
coverage, in such areas as securities fraud, the government evaluates (and punishes) statements on 
the basis of their truth or falsity.” (citing Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 
(2004))).  
19. 318 F.3d 575 (3d Cir. 2003). 
20. Id. at 579 (quoting Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 167 A.2d 625, 628 (N.J. 1961)).  
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95, 597 (1993).  
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applicable First Amendment norm against content discrimination, courts 
are not generally regarded as incompetent to adjudicate expert 
controversies.22 
This suggests that we do not discourage courts from second-guessing 
expert opinion in public discourse because we regard courts as 
institutionally incapable of doing so. We instead discourage courts from 
second-guessing expert opinion in public discourse because we do not 
wish them to do so. And no doubt we reach this conclusion because we 
do not want government to control the content of public discourse. 
The most fundamental question of First Amendment doctrine is why 
we disable courts from regulating speech within public discourse, 
although we pervasively empower courts to regulate speech outside of 
public discourse. The thesis of my book is that this doctrinal structure 
expresses our constitutional commitment to achieving the “social end” 
of democratic legitimation. A democratic state must be responsive to 
public opinion, which is why “[a] democracy without public opinion is a 
contradiction in terms.”23 A necessary condition for democratic 
legitimacy is therefore that persons be free to participate in the formation 
of public opinion.24 
The norm against content discrimination is applied within public 
discourse because we do not want the state to form the very public 
opinion to which it should be democratically responsive. Seen from this 
angle, the explanation of the “pervasive” norm of content discrimination 
depends precisely upon the limited scope of its application. The norm 
applies within public discourse, but not outside it. Attending to the 
actual ways in which we regulate speech, rather than to the ways in 
which abstract First Amendment doctrine proclaims that we regulate 
speech, is thus essential to understanding the social ends that 
constitutional doctrine in fact seeks to achieve. 
In his fascinating and comprehensive contribution, Paul Horwitz is 
determined not to be fooled by the bromides of First Amendment 
                                                     
22. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the thought that there may be specific contexts in 
which judicial deference to expert opinion is warranted. In the specific context of disputes involving 
academic freedom, for example, I quite agree with Ambro and Safier that it might sometimes be 
difficult for courts to take “constitutional sides in academic debates involving knowledge gleaned 
from scientific inquiry.” See Ambro & Safier, supra note 10, at 407. Nevertheless, like Ambro and 
Safier (as well as like Professor Judith Areen), I also believe that there is no ground for judicial 
deference when “professional judgment” is not exercised. Id. at 406–07; POST, supra note 9, at 79.  
23. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 287–88 (Anders Wedberg trans., 
1945). 
24. POST, supra note 9, at 9–10, 22–23. 
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doctrine.25 He refuses to be misled by the abstract and patently refutable 
generalizations that courts advance in the name of the First Amendment. 
Instead Horwitz rightly inquires into the “social end” that the First 
Amendment law should be construed to help bring about. It is apparent 
that he holds great affection for the claim that “a search for truth” is “a 
central goal of the First Amendment.”26 Yet Horwitz seems puzzled 
when his research reveals that First Amendment doctrine is 
indeterminate and indecisive on the elemental question of whether false 
statements of fact come within the umbrella of First Amendment 
coverage.27 
One might expect that the fascinating results of his research would 
drive Horwitz to conclude either that achieving truth is not presently a 
central organizing purpose of First Amendment doctrine or that we 
should reorganize First Amendment doctrine so that it can most 
effectively ascertain truth. Curiously, however, Horwitz does not seem 
attracted to either option. He instead advances a melancholy narrative of 
declension. 
As Horwitz tells the tale, there has been a serious “decline of truth-
seeking arguments for freedom of speech.”28 He strongly implies that 
because “First Amendment law will inevitably be concerned with 
epistemically freighted concepts such as truth, falsity, accuracy, and 
reliability,”29 these arguments must be accorded pride of place in First 
Amendment doctrine.30 He seems depressed by the fact that in recent 
years “free speech theory itself has increasingly retreated” from truth-
seeking justifications, and has “focused instead on other justifications, 
such as democratic self-government or individual autonomy.”31 
Whatever else can be said about Horwitz’s complex position, the 
declension narrative is unconvincing. Although in past centuries many 
have argued that freedom of critical inquiry is necessary for the 
advancement of knowledge,32 American judicial decisions applying the 
                                                     
25. See Horwitz, supra note 18. 
26. Id. at 472–73. 
27. Id. at 467–70.  
28. Id. at 489. 
29. Id. at 487–88. 
30. Although it seems quite true that First Amendment doctrine must inevitably deal with such 
epistemological questions, the same could be said of every area of law. Having to deal with 
epistemological questions is a far cry from being about such questions. It does not follow from the 
prominent presence of such questions that the First Amendment is primarily about truth seeking.  
31. Id. at 489.  
32. For a very brief overview, see MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON 
GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 11–27 (2009). 
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First Amendment have almost always been about political speech.33 
Indeed, they have typically explained themselves in terms that echo 
Chief Justice Hughes’ pioneering 1931 opinion in Stromberg v. 
California34: “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political 
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of 
the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an 
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental 
principle of our constitutional system.”35 
If First Amendment doctrine has from the beginning been organized 
to “bring about [the] social end” of democratic legitimation rather than 
of truth,36 the doctrinal uncertainties nicely exposed by Horwitz should 
come as no surprise. “Epistemic” issues of truth or falsity are merely 
ancillary to the primary point of First Amendment jurisprudence, which 
is to protect the free formation of public opinion. Horwitz can of course 
argue that First Amendment doctrine should be reorganized to achieve 
the primary goal of advancing knowledge, but he does not seem inclined 
to take that path. 
Instead his inquiry gravitates toward such mid-level questions as 
whether “false statements per se are a ‘special case’ that demand an 
exception from the general coverage of the First Amendment.”37 This 
kind of question takes the abstract and general nature of First 
Amendment doctrine at face value, and it therefore risks reproducing 
exactly the pathology of First Amendment doctrine that Horwitz seems 
determined to avoid. First Amendment principles can coherently be 
formulated only if they are organized to achieve clear social values. If 
the First Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect democratic 
legitimation, general questions about the abstract constitutional status of 
“false statements per se” can have no very cogent answer. Sometimes 
falsity will be tolerated to further the mission of democratic legitimation, 
sometimes it will not. 
With regard to the criminal libel of a public official, for example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court once proclaimed: 
[E]ven where the utterance is false, the great principles of the 
Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area 
preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the 
                                                     
33. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
34. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
35. Id. at 369. 
36. See POST, supra note 9, at 1–25. 
37. Horwitz, supra note 18, at 461. 
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knowing or reckless falsehood. Debate on public issues will not 
be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be 
proved in court that he spoke out of hatred.38 
The Court has repeatedly interpreted the First Amendment to protect 
mere falsity so that “uninhibited” participation in public discourse can be 
constitutionally encouraged. Outside public discourse, by contrast, the 
Court regularly interprets the First Amendment to penalize mere falsity, 
as is illustrated by constitutional standards applied to commercial speech 
or professional medical advice.39 
This strongly suggests that First Amendment doctrine is not in fact 
organized around epistemic concerns. Of course, ceteris paribus, falsity 
matters. But First Amendment doctrine deliberately subordinates 
epistemological concerns to the requirements of democratic legitimation. 
To ask an abstract question about the status of false statements is to pose 
an inquiry that runs against the purpose of existing First Amendment 
doctrine. Horwitz seems so entranced by epistemic values that with one 
exception he fails to recognize how fundamentally First Amendment 
doctrine would have to be reorganized in order to be fully responsive to 
his concerns. 
The exception involves Horwitz’s articulate defense of an 
“institutionalist” First Amendment.40 Horwitz advocates extending First 
Amendment protection to “infrastructural institutions that form a 
fundamental part of a larger public sphere.”41 Examples would 
apparently include universities, the press, libraries, churches, and 
voluntary associations, which together Horwitz regards as constituting 
                                                     
38. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). In what is undoubtedly the high water mark of 
the Millian emphasis on the epistemological value of error that Horwitz so nicely discusses, the 
Court continued, “even if [a speaker] did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed 
contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.” Id. at 73. As Horwitz 
correctly observes, the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), subsequently 
repudiated the proposition that the publication of false statements honestly believed to be true can 
contribute to “the ascertainment of truth,” thus leaving as the sole justification for the protection of 
falsity within public discourse the political importance of uninhibited participation in public 
discourse. See Horwitz, supra note 18, at 469–70. The Court explained in Garrison, quoting New 
York Times:  
For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.” 
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75 (quoting N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270). 
39. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
40. Horwitz, supra note 18, at 480–86. 
41. Id. at 481 (emphasis in original). 
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“a kind of ‘sovereign sphere.’”42 As far as I can make out, Horwitz 
believes that such institutions should be constitutionally shielded from 
political regulation because they contribute “in unique ways to the 
production of knowledge and deserve[] protection or autonomy.”43 
Horwitz’s argument on this point is so casual that it is difficult to 
follow. Does he seriously believe that voluntary associations and 
churches produce knowledge?44 And although I quite agree that 
institutions like universities do produce knowledge, how should their 
contribution to knowledge be weighed against other equally important 
constitutional values, like democratic self-governance? Does Horwitz 
believe that conflicts among constitutional values do not occur? Or does 
he believe that in the context of such conflicts the significance of 
knowledge is so predominant that it is a waste of time to engage in the 
“considerable and somewhat gymnastic effort” to determine how 
inconsistent constitutional values may be reconciled?45 I fail to see how 
we could possibly determine the precise degree of “autonomy” to which 
infrastructural institutions should be “constitutionally entitled” without 
answering such questions.46 The hardheaded legal realism that Horwitz 
so conspicuously embraces would seem to require that we focus on such 
inquiries. 
Stephen I. Vladeck, like Horwitz, believes that the press is a unique 
and significant infrastructural institution.47 In contrast to Horwitz, 
however, Vladeck is exquisitely aware that specifying constitutional 
protections for the press will require mediating among conflicting 
constitutional values. In his fine and careful contribution, Vladeck nicely 
demonstrates how attributing constitutional autonomy to the press will 
have both costs and benefits.48 
                                                     
42. Id. at 481 & n.235, 482. 
43. Id. at 485. It is not clear to me why Horwitz regards “the production of knowledge” as any 
less “abstract” than conceptual categories like democratic legitimation or democratic competence. 
Id. at 479, 481. It is true that the production of knowledge is not ultimately a political category and 
that Horwitz appears to object to prioritizing political self-determination as a constitutional value. 
Id. at 478–80. Perhaps Horwitz believes that the social stability required for deploying knowledge 
does not require a secure foundation in legitimate self-governance. See id. at 486. There may be 
societies in the world where knowledge creates its own legitimation and stability, but I doubt that 
the United States is among them. 
44. Alternatively, if churches and private associations do not produce knowledge, what social 
goods do they produce, and why should these goods receive exigent constitutional protection? 
45. Id. at 479. 
46. Id. at 482 (emphasis in original). 
47. Stephen I. Vladeck, Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and the Freedom of 
the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 529 (2012). 
48. Id. at 548 (“But the more we seek to articulate constitutional rules for distinguishing between 
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The press is a deeply ambiguous institution. Seen from one 
perspective, the press is a platform for amplifying the voice of engaged 
citizens. Since the early days of the Republic, the press has functioned as 
a mouthpiece for partisan politics; different newspapers have spoken for 
different points of view or for different political parties.49 Seen from 
another perspective, however, the press is a unique institution quite 
distinct from the ordinary citizen. For the past century, elite newspapers 
have imagined themselves as independent, disinterested, and 
professional organizations whose mission is to educate the public about 
newsworthy matters.50 This ideal, born during the progressive era, has 
begun to take institutional root. As Vladeck summarizes the point: 
[T]here are professional standards and ethical norms of conduct 
to which journalists generally aspire. A professional accrediting 
organization (the Accrediting Council on Education in 
Journalism and Mass Communications) supervises 
undergraduate and graduate programs. Additionally, whether or 
not courts have already identified such standards, it is 
possible . . . to identify judicially manageable standards of 
journalism that would allow courts to differentiate between 
those who qualify as practitioners in the field and those who do 
not.51 
In our own time, the independent and disinterested institution of the 
press is torn between the distinct and potentially conflicting values of 
“neutrality” and “objectivity.”52 
                                                     
these categories, the more that the recipients of special protection in that constitutional scheme 
become dependent upon protecting their special constitutional status. Such a result would also 
almost certainly come at the expense of whatever other values contribute to their role in illuminating 
public discourse.” (emphasis in original)). 
49. This view of the press may underlie the Court’s recent observation in Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010): “We have consistently rejected the proposition that the 
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” Id. at 905 (citing 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). If the 
press is simply a means of amplifying what ordinary speakers have to say, it should not possess 
privileges beyond those of the First Amendment speakers whose voices it broadcasts. 
50. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPERS 160–94 (1978). Horwitz refers to this relatively recent image of the press when he 
observes that “Press practices are rich with disciplinary standards and well-developed self-
regulatory norms and practices.” Horwitz, supra note 18, at 484). 
51. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 540–41 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
52. A “neutral” press understands its mission as reporting on public controversies, but it avoids 
taking part in such controversies. A neutral press will convey to the public that a controversy exists 
between creationists and biologists over the topic of evolution, but it will not intervene to evaluate 
competing positions in the controversy. A neutral press therefore incentivizes persons to 
manufacture “controversies” that threaten public opinion with confusion. This can plainly be seen in 
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In my book, I observe that there are good reasons why the 
disciplinary norms of professions like medicine or law should sometimes 
be accorded independent constitutional status.53 I suggest that the First 
Amendment should be interpreted so as to foster this status because it 
will advance the constitutional value of “democratic competence.”54 
Vladeck sensibly asks whether First Amendment doctrine ought also to 
be interpreted to configure the press as serving the value of democratic 
competence. After all, Vladeck argues, this might express proper respect 
for the necessary role played by the press in educating the public about 
matters of public concern; it might also justify special legal immunities, 
like reporters’ privileges, that seem necessary for the press to fulfill its 
educational mission.55 
In evaluating Vladeck’s suggestion, we should note at the outset that 
the institutional autonomy of the press can be constitutionally justified 
without appealing to the value of democratic competence. Vince Blasi 
long ago persuasively argued that the First Amendment should be 
interpreted to serve a “checking value,” which imagines the press as a 
unique set of institutions that inhabit a structurally antagonistic 
relationship to government.56 We wish to protect the press because we 
wish to encourage the press to “check” the possibility of government 
abuse. As a matter of theory and history, Blasi’s hypothesis has much 
support.57 Vladeck’s discussion of national security demonstrates how 
protections for the press are most important in circumstances when the 
                                                     
the advantage that the tobacco industry took of the obligations of a  neutral press to report only the 
existence of a “controversy” over whether smoking was harmful. In contrast to a “neutral” press, an 
“objective” press will not only report the existence of public controversies, it will also evaluate the 
significance of these controversies by communicating presently existing knowledge. Whereas a 
“neutral” press will report to the public that there is a controversy over global warming, an 
“objective” press will also frame that controversy by reporting the consensus of scientific opinion. 
For an illustration of the difference, see Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Admit It: The 
Republicans Are Worse, WASH. POST, April 29, 2012, at B1. 
53. POST, supra note 9, at 45–46. 
54. Id. at 27–60. Democratic competence refers to “the cognitive empowerment of persons within 
public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary knowledge. Cognitive 
empowerment is necessary both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of democratic 
legitimation.” Id. at 34. 
55. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 541–42. 
56. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521. The checking value plainly underlies decisions like Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583–85 (1983), which configure the press as distinct from 
other speakers and as generically in conflict with the government.  
57. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983). 
Under Blasi’s theory, of course, the “press” would be constitutionally defined as those institutions 
that we regard as advancing the checking value. 
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press and the government occupy adversarial positions.58 
The concept of structural conflict is quite foreign to the value of 
democratic competence. Modeling the constitutional status of the press 
on the kind of disciplinary authority enjoyed by medicine or law would 
authorize government interventions designed to uphold press authority, 
just as government presently intervenes to uphold the authority of 
doctors and lawyers.59 Such interventions would be quite problematic if, 
as Blasi convincingly argues, we wish to fashion First Amendment 
principles that will institutionalize tension between the press and the 
state. 
Vladeck’s essay asks us to clarify why we might accord special 
constitutional status to the press. Should constitutional rules imagine the 
press as amplifying the voice of ordinary citizens, or as providing the 
public with a disinterested and professional form of knowledge, or as 
“checking” government overreaching and abuse? Holmes’ sound advice 
is that we cannot determine the substance of our constitutional doctrine 
until we are first clear about the “social ends” we wish to achieve. 
It is possible that we are ambivalent about our social ends. We may 
yearn both for a professionally competent press and yet admire a press 
that is freewheeling and partisan and that, as Vladeck puts it, exemplifies 
“truly amateur contributions to public discourse.”60 We may 
simultaneously prize press institutions that valiantly oppose the 
government. When our constitutional values conflict in this way, it 
would seem deeply unwise to fashion our constitutional doctrine to give 
exclusive dominion to one or another point of view. The ambiguity of 
contemporary doctrine reflects the ambiguity of our own values, and 
Vladeck seems to me prudent to leave these questions unresolved. 
If constitutional law cannot guarantee that expert knowledge be 
disseminated to the public through the press, how does constitutional 
law imagine that expert knowledge will be communicated to public 
opinion? That is the question Joseph Blocher pursues in a shrewd and 
canny contribution.61 Blocher suggests that if our constitutional 
principles do not permit government to underwrite an authoritative 
                                                     
58. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 543–47. 
59. As Joseph Blocher perceptively observes, using the value of democratic competence to define 
the constitutional value of the press would “mean that the state could police journalists in much the 
same way as it polices commercial or professional speech—to ensure that they are fulfilling the 
functions that entitle them to protection in the first place.” Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert 
Knowledge, and the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 409, 442 (2012). 
60. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 547. 
61. Blocher, supra note 59. 
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expert to speak to the public, we may well ask “whether and to what 
degree expert knowledge actually does inform democratic 
decisionmaking.”62 
Blocher’s question is well taken, and it does not seem to me to have a 
definitive constitutional answer. We know that the state does underwrite 
expertise outside of public discourse; that is the lesson of malpractice 
suits and state proscriptions of misleading commercial speech. But we 
seem reluctant to allow the state analogously to underwrite expertise 
within public discourse. This is because we do not wish the state to 
control the content of public opinion. We would feel queasy if the state 
were to intervene authoritatively to settle the conflicting 
pronouncements of the dueling experts that routinely fill our news 
media. Does this imply, as Blocher seems to suggest, that expertise can 
exist within public discourse only if the state underwrites it?63 
Through its educational responsibilities, through its bully pulpit and 
enormous resources, the state can encourage a proper respect for expert 
knowledge within the public sphere. But whether such knowledge 
receives the weight it deserves within public discourse is not ultimately a 
question of constitutional law, at least not so long as democratic 
legitimation remains our foundational constitutional commitment. I 
myself believe that democratic legitimation must remain lexically prior 
to democratic competence because any action of the state, including any 
action designed to underwrite expertise, must necessarily presuppose 
that the political interventions of the state are legitimate. Such 
legitimacy necessarily depends upon democratic legitimation. This 
implies that if public opinion recklessly abandons authoritative 
knowledge in an uncontrolled quest for ideological wish fulfillment, the 
Constitution alone will not save us.64 
                                                     
62. Id. at 437. 
63. Blocher writes that “there must be some method of accountability, legal or otherwise, for 
claims of expertise in public discourse.” Id. at 434. But of course there is always political 
accountability for speech within public discourse. Why is that not enough? Why “must” there also 
be legal accountability, when any such accountability will necessarily compromise democratic 
legitimation? No doubt democratic competence would be better served if the state could impose 
legal accountability for expert pronouncements within public discourse. But the cost of such 
accountability would be intolerably high. Blocher’s yearning for constitutional clarity seems also to 
underlie his strange assumption that attributing First Amendment value to particular speech acts 
implies “complete protection” or is simply a vain act. Id. at 424–25. Because constitutional values 
often conflict, constitutional protection is frequently bounded and limited. 
64. Blocher writes that “it seems hard to maintain the division between expert knowledge ‘in’ 
public discourse and expert knowledge ‘before’ public discourse. If the point of knowledge is to 
inform public discourse, at some point it must enter into it.” Id. at 435. He is right to raise this 
worry. Although Blocher correctly grasps the constitutional “point” of expert knowledge, he seems 
 
13 -- Post FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/4/2012  9:13 PM 
562 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:549 
 
For constitutional purposes, public opinion forms within the 
uncoerced domain of public discourse. In my book I define public 
discourse in terms of the communicative processes required for the free 
formation of public opinion prerequisite for democratic legitimation: 
The contours of First Amendment coverage, the constitutional 
distinction between speech and action, is therefore to be 
determined in the first instance by a normative inquiry into the 
forms of conduct we deem necessary for the free formation of 
public opinion. . . . Following the usage of the Court, I shall use 
the term “public discourse” to refer to the forms of 
communication constitutionally deemed necessary for formation 
of public opinion.65 
Public discourse is the set of speech acts whose insulation from state 
control is necessary to justify our ongoing belief that we inhabit a 
democracy in which government is responsive to the people. What we 
think of as “ordinary” First Amendment rules, like the “pervasive” norm 
of content neutrality to which Ambro and Safier appeal, typically apply 
to state regulations of public discourse. The basic thought is that the 
state ought to answer to public opinion rather than control the content of 
public opinion. 
Blocher fears that this definition of public discourse is “circular.”66 I 
confess that I do not understand his objection. “Public discourse” is a 
label that we apply to those speech acts that we deem, for constitutional 
and normative reasons, necessary for the free formation of public 
opinion. The boundaries of public discourse are thus set by substantive 
normative judgments. Whether to categorize any particular speech act as 
inside or outside of public discourse no doubt requires difficult and 
complex judgments and trade-offs.67 Sometimes such judgments are 
made retail, and sometimes wholesale. I have no doubt that the 
boundaries of public discourse will prove perennially controversial. But 
                                                     
to imagine a world in which the Constitution can guarantee that expert knowledge actually fulfills 
its “point.” That aspiration seems to me quite beyond the realm of constitutional law. The 
Constitution encourages conditions under which expert knowledge might be able to fulfill its 
“point,” but the Constitution cannot compel public opinion, at least not so long as we remain a 
democracy. 
65. POST, supra note 9, at 15. 
66. Blocher, supra note 59, at 414. I should note that in my view the boundaries of public 
discourse are contextually defined, which means that they are determined by form and content. 
Blocher seems to imagine that I think otherwise, id. at 418–21, but I make this explicit in Robert C. 
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic 
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990). 
67. For a full discussion, see POST, supra note 9. 
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there is nothing at all circular about the question of whether particular 
speech acts should be accorded the constitutional protections we afford 
to public discourse. 
In the end we will define the boundaries of public discourse in ways 
that express our commitments to the value of democratic legitimation. 
These commitments invariably conflict with other complementary and 
inconsistent constitutional goals and values. Such constitutional conflicts 
and uncertainties are inevitable. There is no avoiding them. There is only 
the endless effort to think things, not words. 
 
 
 
